Abstract: China has made tremendous progress in its economic development since it began its economic reform and opened to the World in 1978. It is currently the fastest growing economy in the World-averaging 9.72% per annum over the past 36 years. What are the sources of this Chinese economic growth? Chinese economic growth since 1978 may be attributed to the following sources: (1) The realization of the surplus potential output from the initial economic slack that resulted from the mandatory central planning prior to 1978 (12.65%); (2) The growth of tangible capital (55.71%) and labor (9.67%) inputs; (3) Technical progress (growth of total factor productivity (TFP)) (7.97%); and (4) The effect of economies of scale (13.99%). In the context of China, an important way in which self-fulfilling expectations can be created and changed is through the pronouncement of policy changes and actual actions by a government with credibility. Episodes in which the government was instrumental in changing both the direction and the magnitude of public expectations, and thus enhancing the growth of aggregate demand, are identified and presented.
Introduction
China has made tremendous progress in its economic development since it began its economic reform and opened to the World in 1978. It is currently the fastest growing economy in the World-averaging 9.72% per annum over the past 36 years. It is historically unprecedented for an economy to grow at such a high rate over such a long period of time. However, the Chinese economy has begun to slow down, to an annual rate of growth of around 7%, in a process of transition to a "New Normal". Why has China been able to grow at such a high rate and for such a long 
The Chinese Economic Fundamentals
What are the sources of this Chinese economic growth? Long-term economic growth of a country depends on the rates of growth of its primary inputs-tangible (or physical) capital and labor-and on technical progress (also known as the growth of total factor productivity (TFP))-that is, the ability to increase output without increasing inputs. The rate of growth of tangible or physical capital depends on the rates of investment on structure, equipment and basic infrastructure, which in turn depends on the availability of national savings. The rate of technical progress depends on investment in intangible capital, which includes human capital and Research and Development (R&D) capital.
Chinese economic growth since 1978 has been underpinned by a consistently high domestic investment rate, enabled by a national saving rate of over 35% except for a brief start-up period in the early 1950s (see Chart 3). The Chinese national saving rate rose to around 40% in the early 1990s and at times approached or even exceeded 50% in more recent years. The high Chinese saving rate means that the Chinese economy can finance all of its domestic investment needs from its own domestic savings alone, without having to depend on the more fickle foreign capital inflows (including foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment, foreign aid, or foreign loans). In particular, it does not need to borrow abroad and bear the potential risks of a large, short-term and often interruptible foreign-currency-denominated debt. Thus, the Chinese economy is always assured of a high rate of growth of its tangible capital stock. It is therefore also more immune from external disturbances than most other economies. The huge size of the domestic market with 1.37 billion consumers and their pent-up demands for housing and transportation and other consumer goods and services (e.g., education, health care, and more recently, elderly care) enables the realization of significant economies of scale in production, based entirely on the domestic demand in China. The huge domestic market also greatly enhances the productivity of intangible capital (e.g., R&D capital and goodwill, including brand building) by allowing the fixed costs of the R&D for a new product or process or advertising and promotion in brand building to be more easily amortized and recovered.
In addition, the huge domestic market also enables significant "learning-by-doing", so that the unit costs of production decline with rising cumulative output. This is yet another form of manifestation of economies of scale.
Another important implication of the huge size of the domestic economy is the relatively low external dependence. Thus, while the rates of growth of Chinese exports and imports fluctuate like any other economy (see Charts 6 and 7 for the quarterly rates of growth of exports and imports respectively for selected Asian economies), the quarterly rates of growth of the Chinese real GDP, represented by the red line in Chart 8, can be clearly seen to be relatively much more stable than those of other economies. It never turned negative whereas many of the other Asian economies would experience absolute declines in their real GDPs. This is of course also due in part to the fact that China does not have to depend on the inflow of foreign savings for its investment. Finally, China also had the additional "advantage" of having been a centrally planned economy for more than a quarter of a century before it undertook its economic reform and opened its economy to the World in 1978. A centrally planned economy is well known to have inherent economic inefficiency, or equivalently, economic slack, which implies that China had surplus potential output prior to its economic reform, which could be realized under appropriate economic policies. This prior economic inefficiency or surplus potential output thus also constituted an additional source of Chinese economic growth since 1978.
The Monopsonistic Labor Market in China
Chart 3 above shows that China has an extraordinarily high national saving rate. This rate would be considered high even by the standards of East Asian economies 2 . Why is this the case, especially considering that the Chinese GDP per capita is still significantly below those of other East Asian economies? One explanation is that the Chinese Government was and still is the largest single employer of non-agricultural workers in China and therefore has both the ability and the incentive to keep wage rates low. Before the economic reform of 1978, the Chinese Government was the sole employer for all workers in the urban areas of 2 Among East Asian economies, only Singapore has a comparably high national saving rate. The low-wage policy reflected three considerations: First, it was designed to increase national savings through higher profits of the enterprises, most of which are state-owned, so that the needed domestic investments could be readily financed.
This objective of the low-wage policy is similar to the "price scissors" policy of maintaining a large gap between industrial and agricultural prices, practiced in the former Soviet Union in the early Twentieth Century. Second, it helped to maximize employment, and in particular, the absorption of surplus labor from the agricultural sector into the industrial and service sectors. Third, it was compatible with the ideological preference of the Chinese Communist Party for thrift and egalitarianism in the distribution of income. Note that if the government is the sole employer, the wage and individual income tax policies can be de facto integrated-no separate individual income tax is necessary. In this context, a low-wage (and low or no tax) policy has a similar economic effect as a high-wage and high-tax policy but is politically easier to adopt, implement and sustain.
Even as recently as 2010, the share of Chinese public sector employment, which includes the employees of central and local governments and their affiliated units, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and publicly financed educational and health care institutions, was still over 50% of all urban employment (see Chart 9). The government could therefore exercise a decisive influence on not only the wage rates of the public-sector employees, but also the level of wage rates in the economy as a whole. Today, a government job is still the preferred choice for many Chinese workers because of the job and income security and the significant fringe benefits that it offers.
Chart 9: The Share of Public Sector Employment in Total Non-Agricultural Employment in China
This low-wage policy has had two major effects: first, it has kept the labor share (and the household share) of GDP low; and secondly, it has created large profits for state-owned (and other) enterprises. The disposable household income share of GDP in China may be estimated at around 50% in 2014, much lower than the corresponding share in a developed economy, where it would typically be around 60%, and also lower than those of other developing economies with a comparable real GDP per capita. The Chinese share of labor is likely to be lower than the share of household disposable income, as the latter includes, in addition to wages and salaries, also net proprietor's income, net asset income and net transfers (which amounted to 43% of the total household disposable income), but excludes direct taxes and other mandatory charges such as social security contributions. As Chinese households have less disposable income to spend relative to Chinese GDP, China also has a lower household consumption to GDP ratio than others. This ratio, as well as the total final consumption (which is the sum of government consumption and household consumption) to GDP ratio, have been declining over time (see Chart 10). As of 2014, the total final consumption ratio was just over 50% and the household consumption ratio was approximately 38%, both significantly lower than most other economies with a comparable real GDP per capita. The Chinese household saving rate may be estimated at around 30% from survey data, comparable to those of The high Chinese national saving rate of between 40% and 50% should therefore be attributed to the high propensity to save on the part of Chinese enterprises out of their profits, especially since they distribute very little in terms of cash dividends to their shareholders, which include the Chinese Government (the majority shareholder of the SOEs) and the households. Household income and government revenue can both be increased if the SOEs are required to distribute a greater proportion of their profits as cash dividends to their shareholders, which may in turn lead to higher household and government consumption.
The Sources of Chinese Economic Growth
The rates of growth of Chinese real output, real tangible capital stock and labor (employment) over the past 36 years are presented in Table 1 . It is clear that Chinese economic growth since 1978 could have come from several sources:
(1) The realization of the surplus potential output from the initial economic slack that resulted from mandatory central planning; (2) The growth of tangible capital and labor inputs (and the growth of the intangible inputs such as human capital and R&D The degree of economies of scale cannot be estimated in a straightforward way.
In fact it is under-identified with time-series aggregate data from only a single country--the effects of economies of scale are confounded with the effects of technical 3 In this paper, the contributions of the growth of human capital and R&D capital to Chinese economic growth are not estimated separately but subsumed in the contribution of technical progress or growth of TFP. As pointed out in Section 3, the actual share of labor in GDP in China is low relative to other economies. It may be estimated to be around 50% 6 . However, it is believed that the production elasticity of labor is probably higher than the labor share, somewhere between 0.55 and 0.6, as labor has been systematically underpaid due to the low-wage policy maintained by the Chinese Government. Since there exist increasing returns to scale, capital, as the residual claimant, cannot in general be paid its marginal product; but because labor is actually underpaid, capital can be either underpaid or overpaid relative to its marginal product. With returns to scale assumed to be 1.155, and the production elasticity of labor estimated as between 0.55 and 0.6, the production elasticity of capital may be estimated as ( The results of the growth-accounting exercise are presented in Table 2 . We note that the elimination of the pre-existing economic slack and economies of scale account for respectively 1.23 and 1.36 percentage points, or a total of 2.59 percentage points, of the Chinese economic growth of 9.72% between 1978 and 2014. If we subtract 2.59% from 9.72%, we obtain 7.13%. This average annual rate of growth has been achieved by quite a few other economies over a couple of decades in the past.
Rate of Growth of Real
We also note that the growth of tangible capital accounts for more than half of the growth in real output, whereas the growth of labor and technical progress each account for less than 10 percent of the economic growth. If we take out the contributions of the elimination of the prior economic slack and economies of scale, the growth of tangible capital accounts for the bulk of the remaining economic growth, 5.42% out of 7.13%, or 76%. This is similar to the findings of Kim and Lau (1994) on the sources of economic growth of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies 
The Role of Expectations
Expectations of the future are important determinants of the behavior of enterprises and households, which in turn determines whether and how much they invest and consume respectively. For a large economy such as China, the domestic investment and consumption together determine the level of aggregate demand and ultimately whether the economy grows or stagnates. There are many ways in which expectations about the future may be formed. Expectations may be based on past experience, such as "tomorrow will be the same as today," but they may also not be based solely on past experience, for example, they may be based on the views of so-called opinion leaders. Expectations may also be affected by the occurrence of some important event, such as the breakout of a war, the election of a new government, the rise of an epidemic, or some specific government pronouncement or action, which can credibly cause changes in the public expectations of the future.
Moreover, expectations can often, but not always, and certainly not consistently, be self-fulfilling, if they are sufficiently strongly held by a sufficiently large number of people.
One well-known manifestation of self-fulfilling expectations is in the asset markets. If investors expect the price of an asset, for example, real estate or stock, to go up, and act accordingly by buying real estate or stock, the price of real estate or stock will indeed be driven up by the concerted buying, because the increase in demand in real estate or stock is not and cannot be immediately met by an increase in supply. Thus, the expectations of the investors can be self-fulfilling. There are many such examples in which asset price bubbles are created around the World. estate is likely to be stable, and act accordingly, that is, they do not try to out-bid one another since they know they can always buy a similar property later, then the price of residential real estate will indeed be quite stable. This was what occurred in Singapore, where the government was believed by the public to adjust the rate of release of new lots for residential construction upwards and downwards in the same direction as the price of residential real estate, thus dampening the price changes.
However, the prices of assets cannot continue to go up forever. All asset price bubbles are sustained by new investors with new buying power coming into the market. At some point, the available potential new buying power will be exhausted with the price levels significantly exceeding what can reasonably be supported by the underlying economic fundamentals in steady state. When that happens, the asset prices will begin to fall and fall precipitously. So ultimately, the rosy expectations may fail to be fulfilled. And this will lead to a collective downward revision of the expectations.
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Concluding Remarks
Chinese economic growth during the past 36 years can be attributed to the growth of tangible inputs-tangible capital and labor, and in particular, tangible capital-rather than the growth in intangible capital or technical progress, just as the past economic growth of other East Asian economies at a similar stage of economic development. The successful Chinese experience strongly reaffirms the fundamental importance of having and maintaining a high investment rate, enabled by a high national savings rate, and surplus labor. A low-wage policy was instrumental in a high national saving rate and a rapid rate of absorption of surplus labor. In addition, the size of the Chinese domestic economy is a favorable factor allowing the ready realization of economies of scale and reducing vulnerability to external disturbances.
The prior economic slack, inherent in any previously centrally planned economy, has also been a significant source of economic growth upon Chinese transition to a market economy.
Expectations will continue to play an important role in the Chinese economy.
A strong Chinese central government with the unique power to mobilize domestic aggregate demand can credibly change expectations from negative to positive at critical junctures to keep the economy growing.
